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Honesty Is the Best Policy–When There Is Money in It: Can Firms Promote Honest 




This paper provides experimental evidence on how incentive compensation, peer-group 
behavior, and audit (team) effectiveness influence managerial reporting behavior. Results 
show that an increase in incentive compensation intensity induces subjects to report less 
truthfully. High level of peer honesty promotes truthful reporting; however, the effects are 
weaker when incentive compensation intensity is high. Audit (team) effectiveness shows 
no significant influence on reporting behavior. The results provide the first clear evidence 
that firms need to consider carefully the effect of incentive compensation as well as the 
influence of peer groups when designing contracts. Furthermore, without a credible penalty 
for untruthful financial report, increased audit (team) effectiveness will not promote honest 
reporting.  
 
JEL classification:  G30; J33; M41 
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Honesty Is the Best Policy–When There Is Money in It: Can Firms Promote Honest 
Reporting Behavior by Managers? 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Accounting  regulators,  investors,  and  media  pundits alike  have expressed  a  growing 
concern about the apparent lack of honesty in the financial reports of firms. Triggered by 
many cases in which managers putatively acted unethically, committed fraud, or simply 
did not reveal the full truth, the main question is what can be done to ensure that managers 
report truthfully. I investigate how incentive compensation, peer-group behavior, and audit 
(team) effectiveness influence managerial reporting. Together these three factors represent 
both monetary and non-monetary components and encapsulate many of the mechanisms 
that  have  been  put  forward  to  promote  honest  reporting  behavior  by  regulators  and 
academics. Nevertheless, only very limited empirical evidence exists about their effects. 
Furthermore, while many researchers have identified the need to combine insights from 
economics and behavioral sciences into accounting theories, this call has gone unanswered 
for a long time.  
Only recently have researchers started to document that behavioral factors explain as 
much of managerial reporting behavior as do economic factors (Young 1985; Chow et al. 
1988; Evans et al. 2001; Stevens 2002; Stevens and Thevaranjan 2003; Yu 2004). Evans et 
al. (2001) argue that neither conventional agency models nor types models
1 (Koford and 
Penno 1992) can explain reports that are “partially honest”, i.e., reports that are neither 
purely  wealth-maximizing  nor  purely  honest.  These  studies  have  made  a  considerable 
contribution to integrating economic and behavioral factors in accounting research, but 
there  is  still  little  known  on  how  managers  balance  their  interests  for  wealth  (e.g., 
compensation) and other, non-monetary, considerations when deciding on the honesty of 
their reports (Luft 1997; Evans et al. 2001; Sprinkle 2003). For this reason, I combine both 
monetary  incentives  (incentive  compensation  intensity)  and  non-monetary  governance 
mechanisms  (peer-group  behavior and auditing effectiveness)  to investigate empirically 
their possibly counteractive influences on managerial reporting behavior. 
                                                    
1In agency model, a person (agent) is assumed to maximize his or her utility function, which depends only on 
the individual’s consumption. In types model, people are assumed either ethical or not ethical (purely self-
interested), where ethical agents always tell the truth, regardless of the cost; self-interested agent will always 
cheat in order to maximize wealth.    2                                                                                            
As an interest-alignment tool between managers and firms, incentive compensation has 
attracted a lot of attention due to its effectiveness in increasing firm performance. Recently, 
some authors (e.g., Bruner et al. 2005; Denis et al. 2005; Bergstresser and Philippon 2006) 
have suggested that high incentive intensity could cause undesired managers’ reporting 
behaviors  within  the  legal  boundary  and  beyond  legal  boundary  (e.g.,  earnings 
management and fraudulent reporting). However, other researchers (e.g., Erickson et al. 
2006)  find  no  consistent  evidence  that  incentive  compensation  is  associated  with 
accounting  fraud.  Given  its  popularity  and  importance  in  practice  and  the  ambiguous 
results from earlier research, more evidence regarding its potential to cause undesirable 
behavior is warranted.  
Meanwhile, both practitioners and academics are seeking effective  governance tools, 
such as executive compensation, concentrated holding, monitoring by boards of directors 
etc., to address such unwanted behavior. Besides these formal governance mechanisms, 
accounting  researchers have explored  and  identified  a  number  of  behavioral  factors as 
informal governance tools to promote the truthfulness of managerial reporting (e.g., Chow 
et al. 1988; Evans et al. 2001; Sprinkle et al. 2002; Stevens 2002; Stevens and Thevaranjan 
2003; Yu 2004; Stevens and Thevaranjan 2005; Hannan et al. 2006). However, among all 
the  mechanisms that can be used, little attention has been given to the influence of peer-
group reporting behavior on managerial honesty, although a relation is likely given the 
evidence in associated fields (see, e.g., Bernheim 1994; Barron and Gjerde 1997; Huddart 
and  Fischer  2004;  Slemrod  2004).  I  examine  whether  peer-group  behavior  affects  the 
honesty of managerial reporting.  
Only examining the role of peer behavior and ignoring the role of formal governance 
mechanisms may overemphasize the former. Furthermore, the social ethical environment 
should  be  studied  together  with  more  formal  governance  mechanism  (Sprinkle  2003). 
Given  the  reasoning,  the  presence  of  a  formal  governance  mechanism  is  necessary.  I 
operationalize formal governance mechanisms in terms of auditing effectiveness of internal 
audit team for the following reasons. Firstly, internal audit team, viewed as eyes and ears 
of  the  audit  committee  of  a  firm,  is  a  commonly  used  corporate  formal  governance 
mechanism in practice; one of its most important functions is to assist audit committee in 
fulfilling its oversight responsibilities for the integrity of the company’s financial statement. 
“…the U.S. congress place a great reliance on the company’s audit committee as a means 
of protecting the integrity of financial reporting” (Carcello et al. 2006a p. 1). Secondly, the 
evidence regarding the relation between governance practice effectiveness and earnings   3                                                                                            
constraint behavior is still inconsistent. Some researchers (Peasnell et al. 2000; Chtourou et 
al. 2001; Xie et al. 2001; Carcello et al. 2006b; Klein 2006) find that effective board and 
audit  committee  (in  terms  of  board  composition,  board  independence  and  member’s 
financial  sophistication)  constrain  earnings  management  activities.  While  Bown  et  al. 
(Bowen et al. 2005) find that there is no clear evidence that poor governance quality is 
related with managerial accounting discretion. Thirdly, by using an experimental design, 
the effectiveness of audit and the extent of misreporting can be directly measured and thus 
I  can  provide  more  direct  evidence.  Therefore,  I  examine  audit  (team)  effectiveness, 
together with peer-group behavior, and explore their influence on managerial reporting 
behavior.  
I conduct an experiment in which subjects report a cost number to upper-management 
(who only know the range for this number) while subjects know the true cost. Subjects are 
paid  based  on  a  division’s  profit  defined  as  the  difference  between  output  value  and 
reported cost of the project, creating an incentive to underreport the cost. The dependent 
variable is (the degree of) honesty in a manager’s report
2, i.e., the extent to which a report 
accurately reflects the true costs (Evans et al. 2001; Hannan 2005; Hannan et al. 2006). 
The  within-subject  factor  is  incentive  compensation  intensity  in  which  the  managers 
receive  either  50%  or  10%  of  a  division’s  reported  profit.  The  other  two  governance 
mechanisms are between-subject factors. The first one is peer-group behavior, which is 
manipulated as having either a high or a low level of peer honesty in reporting. The second 
one is audit (team) effectiveness, where the detection probability for misreporting is twice 
as high in the high effectiveness setting compared with that in the low effectiveness setting. 
I also control gender and social value orientation (SVO) score of the subjects in the 
analysis. SVO is known to influence individual behavior in payoff distribution settings. 
Based on SVO score, the subjects are classified into proselfs and prosocials (proselfs are 
known  to  be  more  concerned  about  information  regarding  their  own  outcomes,  where 
prosocials tend to maximize joint outcomes and are concerned for the well-being of others). 
 The results suggest that while there is incentive for people to misrepresent cost (in order 
to maximize compensation), people are, in general, quite truthful in making their reporting 
decisions. Both monetary and non-monetary governance mechanisms do have an effect on 
managerial reporting. More importantly, findings show that these mechanisms interact with 
each  other.  Specifically,  I  find  that  managerial  honesty  decreases  with  incentive 
                                                    
2 In this setting, managerial honesty is directly related to the manager’s own payoff and to a firm’s profit, 
since managers’ compensation is subtracted from profit.   4                                                                                            
compensation  intensity  (i.e.,  managerial  honesty  is  lower  under  a  50%  incentive 
compensation  scheme  than  under  a  10%  scheme).  Managerial  honesty  is  significantly 
higher when subjects observe that the majority (75-90% of the population) of their peers 
are honest. The effect of peer reporting  behavior is, however, smaller when incentive-
intensity is high. In contrast to my expectation, audit (team) effectiveness is not associated 
with managerial honesty. Finally, contrast to Benabou and Triole’s (2006) observations 
that  extrinsic  incentives  can  crowd  out  “intrinsic  motivation”,  I  find  that  prosocial 
managers always make more honest reports than proself managers. Another interesting 
finding is that  male participants  tend  to underreport true cost  more  than  women when 
facing higher incentive intensity. 
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, the evidence in this study speaks directly 
to  the  effectiveness  of  (governance)  mechanisms  aimed  at  promoting  truthful  reports, 
which  are  found  in  practice.  For  example,  audit  (team)  effectiveness,  and  publicly 
revealing budgets of peer managers are frequently mentioned as helpful to promote truthful 
reporting.
3 Nevertheless,  these  governance-tools  are  only  just  finding  their  way  into 
companies.  To the best of my knowledge, I am the first to investigate empirically the 
effects of peer reporting behavior on the truthfulness of managerial reporting both in its 
own right and with respect to its interplay with monetary incentives. The implications of 
the  findings  give  support  for  practitioners  to  invest  in  a  highly  ethical  environment.  
Second, the results reveal that research of this sort may encounter an omitted variable bias 
without controlling individual differences, such as SVO and gender, since these variables 
do matter with respect to truthful managerial reporting.  
 
 
2. Hypotheses development 
 
  I start with my hypothesis for incentive compensation intensity, followed by prediction 
for non-monetary governance mechanisms—peer honesty and audit (team) effectiveness. 
Then  the  interactive  effects  between  incentive  intensity  and  non-monetary  governance 
mechanisms are discussed. Finally the control variables are explained. 
                                                    
3 In a broader sense, peer-group behavior can lead to a corporate culture that is either benign or malignant. 
The documentary “The smartest guys in the room” on the ENRON affair suggests that this firm was rife with 
unethical  behavior.  Being  dishonest  was  the  norm  and  deviating  from  this  behavior  would  render  an 
individual manager an outcast. 
   5                                                                                            
 
2.1 Incentive compensation intensity 
 
Incentive compensation is commonly used to mitigate the conflict of interest between 
principals and managers. Incentive compensation is said to be effective in encouraging and 
motivating  managers  to  work  harder.  However,  managers  may  also  be  motivated  to 
increase  their  compensation  at  the  expense  of  the  firm.  The  more  incentive-intensive 
compensation  is,  the  higher  the  payoff  from  manipulating  the  performance  measures. 
Consistent with this argument, Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) provide evidence that 
companies with more “incentivized” CEOs have higher levels of earnings management. 
Bruner  et  al.  (2005),  using  experiments,  also  find  the  amount  of  managerial  fraud 
committed by subjects is positively correlated with the (equity) incentive compensation of 
managers.  However,  Erickson  et  al.  (2006)  compare  executive  (equity)  incentive 
compensation  of  firms  accused  of  accounting  fraud  by  the  Securities  and  Exchange 
Commission (SEC) during the period 1996-2003 with two samples of firms not accused of 
fraud and find no consistent evidence that (equity) incentive compensation are associated 
with fraud. Given the inconsistent evidence, I hypothesize the relation between managers’ 
incentive compensation and reporting behavior in a null form:  
 
H1.  The  truthfulness  of  a  manager’s  report  is  not  influenced  by  the  incentive 
compensation-intensity.  
 
2.2 Non-monetary governance mechanisms 
 
Peer  managers’  reporting  behavior:  Both  psychologists  and  economists  believe  that 
individuals conform  to norms  of behavior established by their peers’ actions; much of 
people's behavior then is influenced by their perceptions of what is "normal" or "typical". 
The reason is that individuals incur a lower cost (e.g., feelings of guilt or loss of self-
respect) for an undesirable action when other individuals undertake such action as well 
(Rotter 1966; Kohlberg 1984; Huddart and Fischer 2004).  
So  far,  previous  researchers  have  not  examined  directly  the  relation  between  peer 
managers’ behavior and truthful reporting. Nevertheless, there is some evidence in other 
fields that is suggestive of the influence of peers. For example, tax compliance researchers 
(Jackson  and  Milliron  1989;  Trivedi  et  al.  2003)  find  that  highly  non-compliant  peers   6                                                                                            
reduce the compliance of other taxpayers. Zey-Ferrell et al. (1979) show that unethical 
decision-making  by  marketing  managers  is  influenced  by  peer  behavior.  Huddart  and 
Fischer (2005) show in a model how “established norms” or “peer pressure” can influence 
an individual’s (un)desirable actions (i.e., earnings manipulation by managers). Given the 
evidence, I hypothesize that:  
 
H2. The truthfulness of a manager’s  report is higher when peers report truthfully.  
 
Audit (team) effectiveness: In essence, an internal audit is a costly investigation aimed at 
countering opportunism and reducing the information asymmetry of managers vis-à-vis 
firm headquarters (Baiman 1990; Penno 1990; Baiman and Sivaramakrishnan 1991; Boyle 
1993; Kachelmeier and Shehata 1997). Usually, the process of internal auditing consists of 
two  potential  stages.  In  the  first  stage,  the  audit  team  has  to  detect  any  opportunistic 
behavior whereas in the second stage a penalty might be considered. I focus on the first 
stage and examine whether auditing effectiveness, in its own right, is sufficient to prevent 
opportunistic behavior. In this setting, increasing the detection probability reduces the ex-
post  information  asymmetry  between  managers  and  headquarters
4.  While  no  earlier 
evidence  exists  regarding  this  type  of  information  asymmetry,  several  studies  have 
investigated  the  effect  of  pre-decision  information  asymmetry  between  managers  and 
headquarters on budgetary slack and find mixed evidence (Young 1985; Chow et al. 1988; 
Stevens 2002; Hannan et al. 2006). Note that in the current setting information asymmetry 
can  only  be  reduced  after  the  reporting  decision  has  been  made.  Indeed,  to  establish 
whether managers have reported truthfully or not is only possible after they make their 
reports. Though the mixed evidence exists regarding (pre-decision) information asymmetry, 
given that increased audit effectiveness can reduce (after-decision) information asymmetry 
in this setting, I predict that less information asymmetry lead managers to report more 
truthfully. 
 
H3. Audit (team) effectiveness has a positive effect on the truthfulness of managerial report.  
 
                                                    
4 Studies on information systems are typically categorized according to whether they analyze pre- or post-
decision  information  (Baiman  and  Evans  1983;  Baiman  and  Sivaramakrishnan  1991).  Pre-decision 
information  is  information  on  which  individuals  can  base  their  decisions.  Conversely,  post-decision 
information cannot be used for decision making because it arrives after the decision has been implemented 
(Baiman and Sivaramakrishnan, 1991, p. 747). 
   7                                                                                            
2.3 Interactive effects 
 
Koford and Penno (1992) argue that whether a person behaves ethically depends on, to 
some extent, balancing self-interests against the interest of others or, balancing self-interest 
against some moral standards. Brickley et al (1997) also argue that the level of honesty 
declines  as  the  payoff  to  lying  increase.  These  arguments  suggest  the  presence  of 
interactive effects between incentive compensation and governance mechanisms examined 
in this paper.  
Consistent with these views, managers will trade off their own wealth and the desire to 
behave the same as their peers when their peers report truthfully. With high incentive-
intensive contracts, the costs of following their peers are higher since the managers need to 
forgo larger amounts of money by reporting truthfully. Given this expected high cost of 
following their peers, I predict that subjects will less likely to follow their honest peers 
when they have  high incentive-intensive contracts.  
For  the  interaction  between  incentive  compensation  intensity  and  audit  (team) 
effectiveness,  I  also  expect  that  the  effect  of  audit  (team)  effectiveness  on  managerial 
honest reporting will be lower under stronger monetary incentives since it is too costly for 
a manager to be honest in this situation. 
  
H4A.  There  is  an  interactive effect  between incentive compensation-intensity  and  peer 
reporting behavior on the truthfulness of managerial  report.  
 
H4B. There is an interactive effect between incentive compensation-intensity and audit 
(team)  effectiveness on the truthfulness of managerial report. 
 
2.4 Control variables: social value orientation (SVO) and gender 
 
Besides gender, which is found an important control variable in explaining reporting 
behavior (Schwartz and Wallin 2002), individuals also tend to differ systematically in their 
personal preference for a particular distribution of payoffs to themselves and another party. 
Researchers found this personal preference might play a role in limiting misrepresentations 
(Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Fehr and Schmidt 2003). The individual preference is  called 
social value orientation (SVO) (Messick and McClintock 1968; Kuhlman and Marshello   8                                                                                            
1975;  Liebrand  et  al.  1986;  McClintlock  and  Liebrand  1988;  Van  Lange  et  al.  1997; 
Michael et al. 2004). 
In this setting, I expect SVO to play a role since a manager’s reporting decisions will 
directly influence both his and the firm’s payoff. Prior researchers classify people as either 
prosocial  or  proself based  on  SVO  scores  (Van  Lange et al.  1997).  Proselfs  are  more 
concerned about their own wellbeing and the consequences of exploitation (also described 
as greed). They are less concerned about the well-being of others (Derlega and Grzelak 
1982; Camac 1992; Van Lange et al. 1997; Nauta et al. 2002). In contrast, prosocials tend 
to maximize joint outcomes and are concerned for the well-being of others. Based on the 
classifications,  I  will  explore  whether  proself  managers  are  more  likely  to  report 
untruthfully  in order to maximize their  own  payoff and,  in contrast, whether prosocial 
managers are less  likely to benefit  themselves at the expense of the firm by reporting 
untruthfully. 
 
3. Method and design  
 
A computer-based experiment is conducted to examine the factors of interest. The case 
materials were adapted from several studies (Evans et al. 2001; Hannan et al. 2002; Yu 
2004). All subjects are assumed to be division managers of a firm. They need to make cost 
reports to their headquarters. The incentive scheme induces untruthful reporting because 
the participants’ compensation is based on the profit of their divisions, which equals the 
output  value  minus  the  reported  costs.  Managers  can  maximize  their  wealth  by 
underreporting the cost figures
5. Participants are paid based on the results in all 10 rounds 




I  manipulated  three  experimental  factors:  incentive-intensity  is  manipulated  within 
subject; peer-group behavior and audit effectiveness are manipulated between subjects.  
 
                                                    
5 A common real life situation is in the initial phases of a project/investment decision. A manager will often 
underestimate the cost to get approval for the investment and to be rewarded positively on the number of 
investment projects he gets.     9                                                                                            
Incentive compensation intensity (ICI): For each experimental round, the compensation 
for  division  managers  specified  by  headquarters  is either  10%  or  50% of  the  reported 
division’s profit (output value – reported cost). The 10 rounds alternated between the two 
compensation  contracts  and  were  counterbalanced  across  sessions  to  control  for  order 
effects (i.e., either 10%-50% or 50%-10%). In sum, each subject plays five rounds with 
low incentive compensation and five rounds with high incentive compensation.  
 
Peer Honesty (PH): In each round, subjects are provided with information about their 
peer managers’ reporting decision at an average level, where their peers are defined as a 
group  of  other  managers  of  approximately  the  same  status  (i.e.,  position,  investment 
projects, compensation, decision rights ). In the setting with high peer honesty, participants 
receive a message that about 75-90% of managers reported a cost number which equals to 
the true cost  of the investment,  where these  managers were  in a similar setting as the 
participants are. In contrast, in the setting with low peer honesty, participants receive a 
message suggesting that around 10-25% managers reported a cost number which equals the 
true cost of the investment.  
 
Audit (team) effectiveness (AE): In the experimental instructions, subjects learn about the 
fact that the headquarters of the firm will send an audit team to their division to investigate 
their reported costs. Headquarters also determine whether the firm either has at least one 
financial  expert  serving  on  its  audit  team  or  does  not  have  a  financial  expert.  All 
participants are informed that the audit team has some incomplete knowledge about the 
true costs of the project and will form an opinion about the managers’ reported costs (i.e., 
either favorable or  unfavorable). Then the audit team will send a message to both  the 
manager  and  the  headquarters  based  on  its  findings.  If  its  opinion  is  favorable,  the 
following message is displayed: 
"After reviewing your report, I find the costs you reported are fair. This finding has 
been reported to the headquarters.  
                                                                                                The Audit Team" 
If the opinion is not favorable, the participant receives the following message: 
“Warning: 
After reviewing your report, I find the costs you reported are questionable. This finding has 
been reported to the headquarters.  
                                                                                         The Audit Team"   10                                                                                            
The audit team is modeled to detect the untruthful reporting with certain probabilities. 
Subjects do not receive information about the probability of detection; they learn this in the 
process of play. In case of an audit team with low effectiveness, the detection probability is 
increasing with the level of deviation from a truthful report with an equal rate: if managers 
deviate by no more than 10%, 20%, 30%, 40% or above from a truthful report, there is a 
corresponding 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, and 50% probability of being detected. In case of an 
effective audit team, the detection probability doubles compared to audit team with low 
effectiveness. For example, if managers deviate by 1% to 10% from a truthful report, there 
is a 20% probability of being detected; if managers deviate by 10% to 20% from a truthful 
report, there is a 40% probability of being detected; and so on. 
 
3.2 Participants, tasks and procedures 
 
The 118 participants in the experiment are undergraduate students, recruited from an 
accounting  course  of  a  business  studies  program  of  a  west-European  university.  Upon 
entering  the  computer  lab,  they  are  randomly  assigned  to  the  between-subject  factor 
conditions. Demographic data are reported in Table 1. On average, they are 21.5 years old 
and have 21 months of (part-time) work experience. Twenty-four out of 118 participants 
have accounting-related work experience.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
In  each  round,  division  managers  are  responsible  for  an  investment  project.  At  the 
beginning of each period, headquarters propose a contract, which specifies a manager’s 
compensation. The costs of the project range from 500 to 2500. Information asymmetry is 
present because the headquarters of the firm only know that the costs of this project range 
between  500  and  2500,  with  equal  probabilities  for  each  value  within  the  range.  The 
division manager learns the true cost of the project at the beginning of each period. Both 
division managers and headquarters observe the output value of the project. The managers 
need  to  prepare  a  cost  report  to  the  headquarters.  A  manager’s  payoff  equals  the 
compensation rate (set by headquarters) multiplied by the difference of output value and 
reported costs: manager’s payoff = compensation rate *(output value - reported costs). The 
manager  can  maximize  his  payoff  by  reporting  a  lower  cost  than  the  true  costs.  The 
company’s payoff is the project’s payoff minus the manager’s compensation: division’s 
contribution to firm profit = project's payoff - manager’s payoff.  Managers face a trade-off   11                                                                                            
between lying to maximize wealth and reporting honestly. The output value and true cost 
for each round were randomly chosen within a certain range by the experimenter.  
Each subject is assigned randomly a confidential experimental ID when they enter the 
lab. This experimental ID will be used for cash payment. Before they start the experimental 
task, subjects need to read the general instructions about the experiment. Then they give 
some personal background information (age, gender, nationality, work experience etc.). 
Subjects also need to take a pre-experiment questionnaire, which measures their social 
value orientation scores (SVO)
6. Before they continue their tasks, a hypothetical example 
is  given  to  help  the  subjects  to  understand  the  instructions  better  (see  Appendix  A). 
Subjects also solve seven true or false questions and two calculation questions regarding 
the experimental instructions. They are not allowed to continue unless they answer all 
questions correctly. The instructor remains in the room to answer questions from subjects.  
Subjects’ cash payment is based on a participation fee of €3 and the total experimental 
euros (EEs) they earned over all 10 periods at the conversion ratio of 500 EEs to €1. 
Theoretically, each participant can earn €15 if they lie to the maximum extent and €9 if 
they report truthfully. The results show that the average payoff per participant is €10.35. 
After the experiment, subjects complete a questionnaire which examines the effectiveness 
of the manipulations and subject’s understanding about the experiment (see Appendix B 




4.1 Manipulation checks 
   
In  the  exit  questionnaire,  I  asked  questions  with  regard  to  the  effectiveness  of  my 
manipulations on a Likert scale of 1 “completely disagree” to 7 “completely agree”. Three 
statements (two in positive and one in negative phrasing) are used as manipulation checks. 
Average responses for all the three treatments are significantly different from the neutral 
response of 4 (p<0.001). The subjects agree that their cost report behavior is influenced by 
(1) incentive compensation rate (mean response 5.00, SD=1.71), (2) peer managers’ report 
                                                    
6 SVO measure is adopted from the psychology and the economics literature (McClintock 1972; Kuhlman 
and Marshello 1975; Van Lange 2000). Social value orientations are measured by having people divide a 
hypothetical  amount  of  money  between  themselves  and  a  hypothetical  other.  see  Appendix  C  for  the 
measurement.   12                                                                                            
(mean response 5.01, SD=1.62), and (3) auditing team (mean response 4.86, SD=1.44). 
The results indicate that these manipulations are successful. 
The exit questionnaire also contains five statements to examine the clarity of instructions 
and motivation. The mean response on these statements ranges from 5.21 to 6.02 and is 
significantly different from the neutral response of 4 (p<0.001). Subjects show that they 
correctly understood the experiment and in general their motivation was high.  
 
4.2 Summary statistics for dependent variable 
 
I measure managerial honesty by a percentage metric ranging from 0 to 100%, where a 
higher  ratio  indicates  a  high  level  of  honest  reporting  (Panel  A  of  Table  2  gives  the 
formula). Higher ratio indicates that participants forgo a lot of compensation by reporting a 
figure close to the true cost (and far from the minimum cost reporting by which they would 
maximize their compensation).  
Following Evans et al (2001), I perform the analyses on adjusted data by replacing a 
small number of inconsistent reports (25 out of 1800 total reports) with the true cost
7.  
Panel B of Table 2 gives summary statistics for the level of honest reporting under the 
three factor conditions. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
The results from Table 2 show that managerial honesty is higher with 10% incentive 
compensation (ICI) (mean = 83.34) compared to that with 50% incentive compensation 
(ICI) (mean = 79.23). Under both incentive contracts, subjects seem to conform to what 
their peers do: they are more honest when their peers report truthfully and less honest when 
their peers also engage more in underreporting the true cost. The influence of peer honesty 
(PH) is larger under 10% ICI (78.92 vs. 88.08) compared with that under 50% ICI (75.49 
vs.  83.24).  With  regard  to  audit  (team)  effectiveness  (AE),  subjects  seem  to  be  more 
truthful with a less effective audit team. In contrast with the effect of PH, the influence of 
AE seems larger under 50% ICI (82.08 vs. 76.47) than that under 10% ICI (84.42 vs. 
82.30). 
  
4.3 Tests of hypotheses 
                                                    
7 These reports are for costs higher than the true costs, which are inconsistent with subjects’ trading off 
wealth and honesty because they would have received a higher payoff by reporting honestly. The analyses 
are also performed based on unadjusted data. The results show that the conclusions are not qualitatively 
affected by the adjustment.      13                                                                                            
 
To facilitate comparison, the analyses are based on standardized values of the honest 
reporting metric (with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one). Table 3 gives the 
full factorial ANCOVA analyses with ICI as a repeated measure (10% vs. 50%). ICI was 
counter balanced (see manipulations for details). The test shows that there is no order 
effect (p>0.6). 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
The  results  from  Table  3  show  that,  for  within-subjects  contrast  analyses,  the 
truthfulness  of  reports  is  significantly  influenced  by  ICI  (p<0.05).  From  the  summary 
statistics, we know that subjects report more truthfully under 10% ICI. The results reject 
the  null  form  of  H1.  Results  of  between-subjects  analyses  suggest  that  PH  influences 
significantly the truthfulness of reports (p<0.05). Again the summary statistics confirm that 
managers report more truthfully when the majority of their peers are honest. In sum, the 
results  support  H2.  Surprisingly,  in  contrast  to  H3,  AE  is  not  a  significant  factor 
influencing the truthfulness of reports. Besides these main effects, consistent with H4A, 
the results also suggest the existence of an interactive effect between ICI and PH (p<0.1). I 
find no evidence, however, supporting H4B about the interaction between ICI and AE. 
Furthermore,  the  results  also  reveal  that  SVO  is  a  significant  control  variable  when 
examining managerial reporting behavior (p<0.05). In addition, ICI interacts with Gender 
(p<0.001) to influence managerial honesty. To see more clearly the directional effects of 
these interactions, figures for selected interactive effects are presented in Panel A of Table 
4. Panel B of  Table 4 presents the ANOVA results  for the factors of incentive in  the 
metrics of high and low ICI.   
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Figure 1 shows the interactive effect of ICI and PH on managerial reporting. PH works 
more  effectively  under  low  ICI  than  under  high  ICI.  Under  low  ICI,  the  average 
managerial honest reporting is 0.22 above the mean when PH is high, while the average 
managerial honest reporting is 0.21 below the mean when PH is low; under high ICI, the 
average managerial honest reporting is 0.16 above the mean when PH is high, while the 
average managerial honest reporting is 0.15 below the mean when PH is low. Consistent 
with this result, Panel B shows that under low ICI, PH influence managerial reporting 
behavior  significantly  at  p<0.05;  under  high  ICI,  PH  no  longer  shows  a  significant 
influence.  Figure 2 shows the interactive effect between ICI and AE. As evidenced in 
regression analysis, the effect of AE on the truthfulness of reporting is not significant. The   14                                                                                            
interactive effect between ICI and AE is also negligible but it seems that AE has a larger 
effect under high ICI: honest reporting is 0.05 above (below) the mean when AE is low 
(high) under low ICI, whereas, under high ICI, honest reporting is 0.13 above (below) the 
mean when AE is low (high). Univariate analyses from Panel B show that AE’s influence 
is naught under low ICI and marginally significant at p<0.1 under high ICI. Figure 3 shows 
the interactive effect of ICI and SVO. Consistent with the theory, SVO is constant across 
the two levels of ICI. However, when subjects are classified as prosocials, the truthfulness 
of their reports is 0.32 higher than the mean; while when subjects are classified as proselfs, 
the truthfulness of their reports is 0.14 lower than the mean. Panel B further presents that, 
as a personal trait measure, SVO is significant in both regressions. Figure 4 presents the 
interactive effects between ICI and Gender. The figure reveals that there is a significant 
difference of reporting behavior between male and female subjects regarding the influence 
of ICI. When ICI is switched from low to high, male subjects report dramatically less 
honest moving from 0.11 above the mean to 0.07 below the mean. When ICI is switched 
from low to high, female subjects report considerably more honest from 0.12 below the 
mean to 0.08 above the mean. Though ANOVA analysis of Panel B show that Gender has 
no significant effect under both ICI, there is a directional change from less to more honest 
reporting of female subjects, and from more to less honest reporting of male subjects when 
ICI is switched from low to high.  
 
4.4 Sensitivity analyses 
 
Alternative  measure  for  managerial  honesty:  The  analysis  is  repeated  based  on  a 
frequency measure defined as the number of rounds in which the subject revealed true cost 
out of total experimental rounds for each treatment (five rounds each for the two level of 
ICI). The full factorial ANCOVA repeated measure results remain the same as reported in 
Table 3 and 4, although the interaction between ICI and PH becomes a little bit weaker. In 
the univariate analysis, AE is insignificant.  
 
Results based on sub-sample without outliers: Three out of 118 participants lied to the 
maximum  extent  in  all  experimental  rounds.  All  of  these  subjects  are  in  the  high  AE 
conditions. I performed detection tests to check whether these three observations can be   15                                                                                            
labeled  as  outliers.
8 In  the  tests,  the  results  indicate  that  these  three  observations  are 
outliers. I re-performed the analyses based on the sample without these outliers (results are 
not tabulated). The results from the full factorial ANCOVA analysis remain materially the 
same. The results from the univariate analysis also stay the same although AE becomes 
insignificant.  
 
Results with more control variables:  work experience and accounting experience are 
added as extra control variables. The results remain the same and work experience and 
accounting experience show positive effects on managerial honesty which may indicate 
that subjects with (accounting) work experience are more cautious when making financial 
reports.  
 
Results based on four round data: Data from the final experimental round may not be 
reliable since previous experiments show that there is “final-round” effect (subjects behave 
quite differently in the last experimental round)(Haan et al. 2006). The results based on 
four-round data are largely consistent with the results from the analysis of five-round data 
(results are not tabulated). 
 
The effect of AE on sub-samples: Samples are divided into two sub-samples according to 
whether the participants made a dishonest report above or below the mean in the first or the 
second round. In low effectiveness audit setting, the honest participants (made dishonest 
reporting figures below the mean) show an upward trend in making dishonest report, while 
in high effectiveness audit setting, the dishonest report made by honest participants showed 
an upward trend and reached a peak in the forth round and then decreased till the last round. 
It  seems these participant got caught and felt ashamed  and then became  very cautious 
about  their  reporting  behavior.  The  dishonest  participants  (made  dishonest  reporting 
figures above the mean) show a quite flat trend regarding their dishonest reporting figures. 
It seems the audit effectiveness works partly for some participants and on average it does 
not show any significant effects.  
 
                                                    
8 A test heuristic states that an observation with a z-score greater than three should be labeled as an outlier. In 
a more reliable test, modified z-score test is determined based on outlier resistant estimators. The median of 
absolute deviation about the median (MAD) is such an estimator. The test heuristic states that an observation 
with a modified z-score greater than three and a half should be labeled as an outlier.   16                                                                                            
Overall, the sensitivity check shows that the evidence regarding H1, H2 and H4A is 
quite robust. Furthermore, SVO and gender are significant control variables of reporting 
behavior, while AE on its own and in conjunction with other variables does usually not 
affect reporting behavior.  
 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
 
This paper provides experimental evidence on how incentive compensation, peer-group 
behavior and audit effectiveness influence managerial reporting behavior. The results show 
that high incentive compensation intensity (ICI) induces subject to report less truthfully, 
which  is  consistent  with  Bergstresser  and  Philippon’s  (2006)  findings  that  highly 
“incentivized”  CEOs  tend  to  manipulate  reported  earnings  more.  High  peer  honesty 
promotes truthful managerial reporting in terms of both percentage and frequency. This 
suggests that peer honesty is a potential candidate to be used as a valuable tool to promote 
more truthful reporting under certain conditions. However, it is worth mentioning that the 
magnitude of honest reporting is influenced more significantly by peer behavior only when 
ICI is low. This provides the first clear evidence that managers trade-off behavioral (non-
monetary)  factors  with  economic  incentives  in  making  their  reporting  decisions.  The 
interactive effect  between incentive compensation and  peer  behavior  is consistent  with 
Brickley et al.’s (1997) trade-off model that the level of honesty declines as the payoff to 
lying  increase.  Under  incentive-intensive  contracts,  the  cost  of  making  truthful  report 
increases, so the managers are less likely to follow their peers to forgo monetary payoff. 
Finally,  there  is  no  conclusive  evidence  regarding  the  effect  of  audit  effectiveness  on 
managerial reporting behavior.  
Besides these environmental variables, both personal trait and gender are found to be 
important control variables of managerial reporting behavior. Proself managers, classified 
according to SVO scores, always report less truthfully compared with prosocial managers. 
An interesting interaction between incentive compensation and gender shows that female 
managers report more truthfully under high ICI compared with that under low ICI while 
their male peers do the opposite. The result is consistent with previous findings (Croson 
and Gneezy 2004) that women are more sensitive to social cues in determining appropriate 
behavior  than  are  men.  For  example,  Andreoni  and  Vesterlund  (2001)  in  a  study  of 
manipulating  the  cost/benefit  ratio  of  giving  money  to  a  recipient,  they  find  that  the   17                                                                                            
behavior of men is more responsive to price changes; in contrast, women tend to equalize 
earnings between the two parties
9. The interaction effect between ICI and gender indicates 
that men care more about wealth maximizing whereas women care equality among parties. 
  In sum, the results discussed above suggest a need to consider carefully the effect of 
incentive compensation as well as the effect of peer behaviors when designing contracts. 
Peer behaviors could either have a positive effect if peers behave in a desired direction or a 
negative effect if peers behave in an undesired direction. The effect of peer-group behavior 
shows the possibility of using an alternative mechanism to promote honesty in managerial 
reporting. Regarding the influence of audit effectiveness, I conclude that without a penalty 
on  detection  of  misreporting,  audit  effectiveness  does  not  promote  truthful  reporting. 
Furthermore, the results about the influence of SVO and gender on the truthfulness of 
reports suggest that SVO and gender should also be carefully taken into account when 
designing contracts and they should be considered (or further explored) in future study on 
managerial reporting.  
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TABLE 1  
Subject demographics (N=118) 
    N=118  Percentage   
Gender  Male  61  51.69   
   Female  57  48.31    
Age  <20 years  21  17.80   
  20-25 years  92  77.96   
   >25 years  5   4.24    
Nationality  Dutch  70  59.32   
  German  13  11.02   
  Chinese  18  15.25   
   Other  17  14.41    
Work experience  0 month  24  20.34   
  0-12 months  34  28.81   
  12-24 months  28  23.73   
   >24 months  32  27.12    
Accounting experience  No  94  79.66   
   Yes  24  20.34    
Study level  First year BA  10    8.47   
  Second year BA  1   0.85   
  Third year BA  79  66.95   
  Master level  24  20.34   
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TABLE 2 
Panel A: Measure of managerial honesty 
Managerial honesty is defined as 1 (   /    ) 1 1
n n Payoff claimed Payoff available i i π = − ∑ ∑ = = , 
where n is the total number of  experimental round the participant plays in one setting;  
the “ Payoff claimed 1
n
i ∑ = ” is the sum of payoff subjects earned by deviating from the true 
costs for the total experimental  rounds, and the “ Payoff available 1
n
i ∑ = ” is the amount that 
a subject could earn by lying to the maximum extent. In this setting, the formula is equivalent 
to 5 5 1- (  cos -  cos )/ (  cos -500) 1 1 true ts reported ts true ts ∑ ∑ , where 500 is the lowest value the 
manager can report. 
Panel B: Summary statistics: Mean honest reporting* under three factor conditions 
  ICI−Low    ICI−High 
  AE    AE 
  Low  High  Total    Low  High  Total 
PH−Low  80.80  77.10  78.92    78.53  72.54  75.49 
  N=30  N=31  N=61    N=30  N=31  N=61 
PH−High  88.31  87.85  88.08    85.89  80.67  83.24 
  N=28  N=29  N=57    N=28  N=29  N=57 
Total  84.42  82.30  83.34    82.08  76.47  79.23 
  N=58  N=60  N=118    N=58  N=60  N=118 
*Honest Reporting: 1-(true costs-reported costs)/(true costs-500). 
ICI−Low:  the condition under which the manager's incentive compensation is 10% of the division's profit. 
ICI−High: the condition under which the manager's incentive compensation is 50% of the division's profit. 
PH−Low:  the condition under which 10-25% of the peer managers' reports are honest. 
PH−High:  the condition under which 75-90% of the peer managers' reports are honest. 
AE−High:  the condition under which audit (team) effectiveness is two times as effective as that under low audit 
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TABLE 3 
Full factorial analyses    GLM repeated measures 
 
Dependent variable:  honest reporting (standardized values)      
Within-Subjects Contrasts   Between-Subject Contrasts   
             
   SS   F-stat.    SS  F-stat.    
  
ICI  0.89  5.66**  PH  6.94  4.06**    
  
ICI * PH  0.43  2.73*  AE  3.82  2.23    
  
ICI* AE  0.27  1.69  PH * AE  0.17  0.10    
  
ICI * PH*AE  0.01  0.08  Gender  0.11  0.07    
  
ICI * Gender  2.21  14.05***  SVO  11.06  6.46**    
        
ICI* SVO  0.12  0.75          
a  Type III sum of squares are reported, F-statistics are in parenthesis.   
*: Significant at 10% level. **: Significant at 5% level. ***: Significant at 1% level.   
Honest reporting: 1- (true costs - reported costs)/(true costs - 500).     
ICI: the condition under which the manager's incentive compensation is either 10% or 50% of his division's profit. 
PH:  equals one if 75-90% of the peer managers' reports are honest, zero if 15-25% of the peer managers’ reports are honest. 
AE: equals one if the audit team is highly effective, zero if it is less effective. Where highly effective audit team is two times as effective 
as low effective audit team. For details, see text for manipulations. 
Gender equals one if subject is male, zero otherwise. 
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TABLE 4 
Panel A: Interactive effects on honest reporting (based on standardized values) 
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Panel B: Univariate analysis under different incentive contract type* 
Dependent Variable: honest reporting with 10% ICI 
  SS 
b  df  F  Sig. 
Corrected Model  12.74  5  2.74  0.02 
PH  5.42  1  5.82  0.02 
AE  1.03  1  1.11  0.29 
PH*AE  0.14  1  0.15  0.70 
Gender  1.66  1  1.78  0.19 
SVO  4.45  1  4.78  0.03 
Dependent Variable: honest reporting with 50% ICI 
  SS  df  F  Sig. 
Corrected Model   11.82  5  3.13  0.03 
PH  1.96  1  2.09  0.15 
AE  3.05  1  3.24  0.07 
PH*AE  0.04  1  0.05  0.83 
Gender  0.67  1  0.71  0.40 
SVO  6.73  1  7.17  0.01 
a  All intercepts are significant but not reported.  
b  Type III sum of squares. 
Honest reporting: 1- (true costs - reported costs)/(true costs - 500).   
ICI: the condition under which the manager's incentive compensation is either 10% or 50% of his division's profit. 
PH:  equals one if 75-90% of the peer managers' reports are honest, zero if 15-25% of the peer managers’ reports are 
honest. 
AE: equals one if the audit team is highly effective, zero if it is less effective. Where highly effective audit team is two times 
as effective as low effective audit team. For details, see text for manipulations. 
Gender: equals one if subject is male, zero otherwise. 
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Appendix A. Overview of an experimental period 
 
 At the beginning of each period, headquarters of the corporation propose a contract about your 
compensation. You have the following investment project: the costs of this project range from 
500 to 2500. This is the only information the headquarters know. As a manager, you know the 
exact costs of the project. Both you and the headquarters observe the output value of the project. 
After completing the project, you need to report the costs of the project to the headquarters. Then 
both your payoff and your division's contribution to firm profit can be calculated.  




   
 
The headquarters     The project                     The output                 You decide                    You are paid                                       
propose                    is completed                   value                          which costs                    according to                                                                                                                                               
your compensation                                         is known                     to report                the compensation                                                                       
contract                                                                                                                                           contract 
      
 
Hypothetical Example (Please read the following example very carefully): 
Please note that this example is only a description of possible actions in an experimental period 
and should not be construed to be the "best" set of actions possible. 
 
[Action 1]  
At  the  beginning  of  each  period,  headquarters  propose  a  contract  about  your  compensation. 
Suppose the contract is the following: 
Your payoff = Compensation rate *(output value - reported costs)      
Suppose the compensation rate is 10%. 
The division's contribution to firm profit is that the project's payoff subtracts your payoff.  That is:  
Your division's contribution to firm profit = Project's payoff -Your payoff 
 
[Action 2]  
The project is completed.  
 
[Action 3]    28                                                                                            
Both you and the headquarters know the output value. Only you know the real costs. Suppose the 
output value is 3000 EEs.  
 
[Action 4]  
You decide  which costs  to report. Suppose  you know  that  the  exact  costs  are 2000  EEs.  The 
headquarters only know that the costs could range in any value between 500 EEs and 2500 EEs 
with equal probabilities. Following shows the effects of your report decision on your payoff and 
your division's contribution to firm's profit. 
If you report that the costs are 2500 EEs,  
Your payoff = 10% * (3000-2500) = 50 EEs  
Division's contribution to firm = 1000-50 =950 EEs 
If you report that the costs are 2000 EEs, 
Your payoff = 10% * (3000-2000) = 100 EEs 
Division's contribution to firm= 1000-100 =900 EEs 
If you report that the costs are 1500 EEs, 
Your payoff = 10% * (3000-1500) = 150 EEs 
Division's contribution to firm= 1000-150 = 850 EEs 
To summarize, both your payoff and your division’s contribution to firm will be influenced 
by your reported costs. If you reported lower costs than real, your division’s contribution to 
the firm will be lower.  
 
[Action 5] 
Based on your reported cost, you will be paid according to your compensation contract.  
    
[Peer Group]  
In a very similar setting, some managers performed the same tasks as you do here. e.g., they had 
the same projects as you; they knew the exact costs but headquarters didn't; they also prepared the 
cost report to the headquarters.  
In each experimental period, you will be provided about these managers' reporting decision 
at an average level.  
 
[Audit Team] 
Since the headquarters don't know the exact costs, in each experimental period, an audit team will 
be sent to your division to investigate your reported costs. The headquarters will also determine 
that the firm either: 
•  has at least one financial expert serving on its audit team; or  
•  does not have a financial expert serving on its audit team.     29                                                                                            
 
The audit team has some knowledge about the true costs of the project. It will give opinion about 
your reported costs. Then the audit team will send a message* to you and the headquarters 
based on its findings.  
 
*If its opinion is favorable, you will receive the following message: 
   "After reviewing your report, we find the cost you reported is fair. This finding has been reported 
to the headquarters.  
                                                                                    The Audit Team" 
                    
 
If its opinion is not favorable, you will receive the following message: 
Warning: 
After reviewing your report, we find the cost you reported is questionable. This finding has been 
reported to the headquarters.  
                                                                                   The Audit Team" 
                                                                  
 
Appendix B. Exit-questionnaire 
 
You will receive 20 questions in relation to the experiment.  
 
Each question has a 1 to 7 answering scale. Fill in the number that applies best to you.   
1              2               3                  4                 5                     6                 7 
    
 
Completely                                                 Nor agree                                                               Completely 
disagree                                                      nor disagree                                                                    agree 
 
1. The instructions were clearly formulated. 
2. I was motivated to perform well in the different parts of the experiment. 
3. I feel stressful with respect to time. 
4. I understood what I had to do in the experiment. 
5. I thought the tasks were fun. 
6. I clearly knew the consequence of my choice.   30                                                                                            
7. When I prepare my own cost report, I consider what other managers report. 
8. I feel pressure when the audit team says my report is questionable. 
9. When I make my reporting decision, the compensation rate is an important factor to       
consider. 
10. Other managers' decisions influence my decision. 
11. The compensation rate affects my cost reporting choice. 
12. The audit team influences my reporting decision. 
13. I don't care about the compensation rate when I make my cost reporting decisions. 
14. I don't care what the audit team says. 
15. I don't care what the other mangers report. 
16. Reporting lower than real cost would be unfair to the firm. 
17. I feel guilty when I report a lower cost than real. 
18. I don't care how much the headquarters get. 
19. I don't feel ashamed when I deviate from the true cost. 
20. I feel guilty when I am caught by audit team. 
 
Appendix C. Measure of social value orientation 
 
Here we set the possible allocation for each matrix. Each matrix has three allocations, 
the cooperative, the individualist and the competitive, always in this order. Participants 
choose one of the following three matrix value according to his/her preference. Finally, the 
score  of  his/her  choices  will  be  calculated  and  he/she  is  classified  into  prosocial 
(cooperative) or proself (individualist and competitive) based on the scores.  
 
[480,480]     [540,280]             [480,80  ] 
[500,500]    [560,300]              [500,100] 
[520,520]     [580,320]              [520,120] 
[490,490]     [560,300]             [500,100] 
[500,500]    [560,300]            [490,90  ] 
[500,500]     [570,300]             [500,100] 
[510,510]    [560,300]             [510,110] 
[500,500]     [550,300]             [500,100] 
[490,490]    [540,300]             [480,100] 
 